In for the long haul?

DELCIVERING AUSTRALIAN AID TO AFGHANISTAN
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WHO IS ACFID?

• The peak body for Australian not for profit aid and development NGOs

• In 2008 for example, ACFID members provided
  ○ support in 110 countries
  ○ Received $812.19m donations from the Australian community (76 percent of its funding)
  ○ Received $130.6m from the Australian Government (12 percent of funds)
  ○ Engaged 23,000 Australian volunteers
BACKGROUND

- ACFID Afghanistan Working Group Commissioned Study
- Evidence-based study
- General trends in aid delivery
- Australian’s aid delivery mechanisms
- Issues and challenges
- Study undertaken over May – July 2010
- Methodology: Literature Review, Interviews
KEY FINDINGS

- Afghanistan is the fourth largest recipient of Australian ODA
- AusAID strategy consistent with Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the national priority programs announced in July 2010 Kabul Conference
- Almost 50 percent of AusAID support through WB administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
- Estimated 15-20 percent of AusAID spending in Uruzgan Province in 2010/11; an increase from 10 percent in 2009/10
- ADF has engaged in reconstruction and stabilisation efforts since 2006 in Uruzgan Province
- Military ‘assistance’ is a key component of COIN strategy which frames international military presence in Afghanistan
KEY FINDINGS

- Australian aid in support of extending the legitimacy and reach of the central government
- A lack of transparency and accountability of Australia’s ODA eligible expenditure to Afghanistan not administered by AusAID
- ADF activities are not disaggregated and its assistance has not been subject to independent evaluation for impact or cost effectiveness

General Trends:
- Aid delivery based on political/military imperatives rather than need
- Aid ‘following the fighting’ and resulting in a peace penalty
- Challenges to the concept that aid used for COIN strategy serves as a peace dividend and that aid increases stability
- Aid saturation and low institutional absorptive capacity
- Challenges in civil-military relations
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Build local capacities and civil society across Afghanistan
- Provide continued support to ARTF but be aware of absorptive capacity
- Develop and implement robust monitoring and evaluation systems for assistance delivered by military and non-military stakeholders
- Ensure clearer disaggregation of Australia’s ODA eligible aid to Afghanistan, including ADF expenditure
- Encourage a whole-of-Afghanistan approach by committing to long term humanitarian and development support to alleviate poverty and instability
- Development agendas should be broadly based: Uruzgan is not Afghanistan